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federal exclusionary procedure could no longer apply only to federal courts, but would be an essential element in the protection of
the individual in state court proceedings.

X
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT - MISREPRESENTATION
AS TO PRE-EXISTING INJuRY No BAR TO RECOVERY. - Plaintiff
initiated this action in a West Virginia state court under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act' seeking damages for injuries
sustained during the course of his employment by the defendant,
the Norfolk and Western Railway. By a special plea, the defendant
entered a defense that the plaintiff was not "employed" within
the meaning of the act.2 This defense was grounded upon
allegations that plaintiff had made fraudulent representations in
his employment application pertaining to his congenitally defective
back condition, that he would not have been hired but for these
misrepresentations, and that the physical defects fraudulently
concealed contributed to the injury. After all the evidence had
been presented, the trial court directed the jury to bring in a
verdict for the defendant on the grounds that the defendant had
been deceived into hiring the plaintiff, and that his misrepresentations had a "direct causal connection" with the injuries. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia declined to review.
On a writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the state court's decision, and held that persons procuring employment by means of fraud other than the precise type defined
by the Court in Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Rock 3
will not be deprived of the status of "employee" under the FELA;
moreover, this status will not be affected by the fact that the
employee's misrepresentation contributed to the injury. Still v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 368 U.S. 35 (1961).
'135 Stat. 65 (1903), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
235 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §51
(1958)

provides:

"Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in

commerce between any of the several States or Territories . . . shall be
liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by

such carrier in such commerce . . . for such injury or death resulting in

whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents or
employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due
to its negligence. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

3279 U.S. 410 (1929).
435 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §51
(1958).
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Generally, when an employment contract is induced by fraud
on the part of the employee not going to the factum of the
contract, the contract is voidable rather than void and recovery
may be had under the act, "at least where there is no causal
connection between the injury and the misrepresentation." 5 Courts
have consistently permitted recovery where there has been fraudulent
employee misrepresentation as to age, 6 name,? prior injuries," and
former place of employment. 9 The "causal connection" 1o limitation
has been more apparent than real, and is often treated perfunctorily by the courts."
Where, however, an employee substituted 2 another to take his physical examination recovery was
denied.1
The question of fraudulent employee misrepresentation under
the act first came before the United States Supreme Court in
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Rock.'8 There the
employee substituted another to take his physical examination,
knowing himself to be physically unqualified for the employment.
Mr. Justice Butler, writing for the majority of the Court, indicated
that while there was no causal connection between the "employee's"
physical condition and the injuries, the misrepresentation "did have
direct relation to the propriety of admitting him to such employment [and] the misrepresentation and the injury may not be
regarded as unrelated contemporary facts." 14 Because of a
fraudulent misrepresentation "so abhorrent to public policy," 15
the plaintiff did not have the requisite status of "employee" under
the act and was denied recovery. The Court, in effect, treated

5Newkirk v. Los Angeles Junction Ry., 21 Cal. 2d 308, 320, 131 P.2d
535, 543 (1942); accord, Lupher v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 81 Kan. 585,
106 Pac. 284 (1910), aff'd, 86 Kan. 712, 122 Pac. 106, affirtnance upheld on
rehearing, 88 Kan. 203, 127 Pac. 541 (1912) (per curiam).
6 Laughter v. Powell, 219 N.C. 689, 14 S.E.2d 826, cert. denied, 314
U.S. 666 (1941).
7 Phillips v. Southern Pac. Co., 14 Cal. App. 2d 454, 58 P.2d 688
(1936).
8 Dawson v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 123 Tex. 191, 70 S.W.2d 392, cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 580 (1934).
9 Quails v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 112 Cal. App. 7, 296 Pac. 645

(1931).

10 Newkirk v. Los Angeles Junction Ry., supra note 5.
11 See Eresafe v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 250 F.2d 619
1957); Matthews v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 54 Cal. App. 2d
P.2d 435 (1942); Blanton v. Northern Pac. Ry., 215 Minn. 442, 10
382 (1943).
12 Stafford v. Baltimore & 0.
R.R., 262 Fed. 807 (N.D.
1919).
13279 U.S. 410 (1929).
14 Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Rock, 279 U.S.
(1929).
15 Ibid.

(2d Cir.
549, 129
N.W. 2d
W. Va.
410, 415
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reconthe contract of employment as void. 16 The Rock case was
7
sidered in Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R.R. v. Borum,1 wherein
the prospective employee misstated his true age in order to gain
employment. The Court, finding that the plaintiff had the status
of "employee," permitted recovery, concluding from the record that
the false statement did not substantially affect the examining
surgeon's conclusion. Mr. Justice Butler, who wrote the Rock
opinion, spoke again for the majority: "It is clear that the facts
found . . . are not sufficient to bring this case within the rule
applied in Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Rock
. . . or the reasons upon which that decisioh rests." 18

Prior to the Rock and Boruzm decisions the courts were faced
with the problem of the causality between the fraud and the injury,
while subsequent cases had the additional burden of determining what
degree and what types of fraud were sufficiently "abhorrent" 19
to deny recovery. 20 Without further guidance, the courts distinguished Rock on a factual basis, and thereby were able to grant
21
In several instances,
recovery in the great majority of cases.
and Borum decisions so
however, the courts interpreted the Rock
22
as to preclude recovery under the act.
16 See Still v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 368 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1961).
17286 U.S. 447 (1932).
18 Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R.R. v. Borum, 286 U.S. 447, 451
(1932) (emphasis added).
19Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Rock, supra note 14, at
415.20
An example of the difficulty incurred by the courts interpreting Rock
can be found in the litigation of a Texas case. Prior to the Borum decision
the trial court, notwithstanding the jury's finding of no causal connection
between the injury and the plaintiff's misrepresentation of prior back and
hip injuries, granted defendant's motion for judgment. The Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas affirmed on the ground that "the trial court correctly . . .
followed the law as announced . . . in the case of Minneapolis Railway v.
Rock . . . to the effect that there can be no recovery by an employee . . .
Dawson v. Texas
who has secured his employment through fraud .......
& Pac. Ry., 45 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1931).
Subsequent to the Borun decision the Supreme Court of Texas reversed,
be
in accordance with the Borum interpretation of Rock that it should that
limited to the factual situation there presented. The court indicated
&
absent causal connection recovery must be granted. Dawson v. Texas580
Pac. Ry., 123 Tex. 191, 196, 70 S.W.2d 392, 394, cert. denied, 293 U.S.
(1934).
21 See Still v. Norfolk & W. Ry., supra note 16, at 41-42. See, e.g.,
Eresafe v. New York, N.H. & H. R1R., 250 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Casso v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 219 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1955); White v. Thompson, 181
Kan. 485, 312 P.2d 612 (1957), aff'd, 183 Kan. 133, 325 P,2d 28 (1958).
22 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Libbey, 199 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1952); Talarowski v. Pennsylvania R.R., 135 F. Supp. 503 (D. Del. 1955); Clark v.
& D.C.
Union Pac. R.R., 70 Idaho 70, 211 P.2d 402 (1949); Fort Worth of
these
R.R. v. Griffin, 27 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). All four
cases involved misrepresentations of physical condition.
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In the principal case the Court was again compelled "in the
interest of the orderly administration of justice, to take a fresh
look at [the problems involved in Rock and Borum] in an effort
to supply an intelligible guide for future decisions." 23 In the
majority opinion, Mr. Justice Black emphasized that the Rock case
certainly did not lay down any broad rule to preclude recovery
in all cases of "employee" fraud. The opinion observed that
the Borum decision clearly limited the application of Rock by
factually distinguishing the two cases, thereby indicating the Court's
"reluctance . . . to extend the vague notions of public policy upon
which [Rock] rested to new factual situations." 24 The Court
went on to contrast the Rock and Borum decisions. Rock, unlike
Borum, had obtained his employment as an imposter. Rock had
never been approved by a company physician as physically fit,
whereas Borum had been approved, and once approved could
not be discharged under the company rules after thirty days.
In both cases, however, there was a material, fraudulent representation without which employment would not have been obtained.
The Court in Borum, therefore, allowed recovery primarily on the
basis of factual distinctions which precluded the application of the
2
Rock rule. 5

Mr. Justice Black noted that being able to distinguish factually
the Rock case was sufficient to show that it laid down no general
principle to bar recovery under the act; moreover, Rock failed
to establish an "intelligible guide" 28 by which courts could
determine what types of fraud were so "abhorrent" as to bar
recovery. The opinion observed that courts avoided the harsh
consequences of Rock by formulating numerous exceptions, but the
few cases denying recovery appeared to the Court "entirely indistinguishable on any significant grounds" from the many cases in
which courts made exceptions.2 7 To avoid further confusion the
Court concluded that the Rock case "must be limited to its precise
facts." 28 The majority felt that the considerations of public policy
upon which the Rock decision was based should not be permitted
to encroach further upon the congressional intent as expressed in
29
the act.

The Court recognized that, in order to be in accord with congressional intent, the terms "employed" and "employee" must be "in23
24
2
5
2

Still v. Norfolk & W. Ry., .supranote 16, at 43-44 (1961).

Id.at 39.
Id. at 41.

Ibd.

27 Id. at 42-43.
28 Id.
29

at 44 (emphasis added).

Id. at 44-45.
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,, 30 The Court
terpreted according to their ordinary meaning ....
indicated that to permit the defense of causal connection to survive
would suggest that an employee could be simultaneously within and
without the benefits of the act, depending solely upon the nature of
his injury. Thus, the defense of direct causal connection between
the misrepresentation and the injury has no meaning under the act.
The majority readily points out that pre-existing defects would be
relevant to the question of mitigation of damages.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the granting of a new
trial, was also of the opinion that, as a matter of law, fraud does
not preclude an employee from claiming the benefits of the act.
Beyond this, however, he was of the view that the approach in
Borum should be followed by submitting to the jury the question
whether "deceit in obtaining employment had materially prejudiced
the employer's efforts to select fit employees." 31 If it did, then
recovery should be barred.
Mr. Justice Whittaker, dissenting, indicated that the question
at hand was not whether one who has procured employment
through fraud may maintain an action under the act, for it is
clear that he may. Rather the issue was whether such a person
was entitled to the benefits of the act. The dissent emphasized
that Congress did not intend to confer the benefits of the act
upon those obtaining employment by fraud, even if such fraud
is not of the precise variety involved in Rock. It further stressed
that to allow one to recover from his own wrong is to "tamper
with the sound underlying principles of the Rock case." 32
The Court's decision sheds new light on the Rock and Borum
cases by indicating that fraud in obtaining employment does not
preclude recovery under the act, and by removing from the
jury the question whether the fraud is of such a type as to
prevent a recovery, except where the factual situation is precisely
the same as that in Rock. In addition, the troublesome question
of causal connection is eliminated, thus depriving the railroads
of another defense and imposing upon them, to an even greater
degree, the obligation of insurers. Under the statute the doctrines
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellowformerly available to carriers as defenses, have been
servant rule,
83
eliminated.
3Old. at 45.
31Id. at 47. Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented upon the Court's holding
in the present case: "The Court does not now overrule Rock but says that it
'must be limited to its precise facts.' I take it this statement refers to the
facts relevant to the result of that case; it does not mean that the plaintiff
must be named Rock."
32Id. at 51 (dissenting opinion).
33See HANNA, FEDERAL REMEDIES FOR EMPLoYEE IN"uRaEs 111 (1955).
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Although the act did not make the employer an insurer, it was
"designed to put on the railroad industry some of the cost for the
legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it consumed. . . ." 34 The conclusion reached in the principal case effectuates that purpose. It
is evident that Congress did not intend to include troublesome
problems of causation that could bring about harsh results in the
application of the act.3 5 The Court' decision will tend to bring
future litigation closer in line with the original objectives of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.

M
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF NLRB AND
LABOR LAw ARBITRATOR WHEN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE BREACHES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT. - Petitioner, a labor union,

sought to compel Westinghouse Electric Corporation to arbitrate

a representation dispute which included a grievance constituting
an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act.'

The col-

lective bargaining agreement required Westinghouse to recognize
the union as the representative of "production and maintenance"
employees. The grievance stated that certain workers supposedly
doing "experimental" work were actually doing "production" work
and hence, that the union should be recognized as the bargaining
agent for these workers. The refusal of Westinghouse to do so
constituted both a breach of contract and an unfair labor practice
since petitioner union had been certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as the representative of "production and maintenance" workers. Since the grievance involved an unfair labor
practice, a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the NLRB,
the question arose whether the controversy could be sent to arbitration, pursuant to an arbitration clause in the agreement, by a
state court.

The Appellate Division held that the dispute should

be heard by the NLRB because of its expertise in the field of
union representation, but emphasized that "a breach of contract
does not become ipso facto incapable of arbitration because it also
34Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68, rehearing denied, 336 U.S.

940 (1949).

35 See Pound, Foreword to Elkind, Which Court?, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 356,
1Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §8(a)(5), 61
be an unfair
Stat. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958). "It shall
labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
159(a). . . ." Ibid.

358-60 (1956).

